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ABSTRACT:
The conventional view of the role of patents in the university research context 
(and more generally) is that patent-enabled exclusivity improves the supply-side 
functioning of markets for university research results (and inventions more 
generally) as well as those markets further downstream for derivative commercial 
end-products.  The reward, prospect, and commercialization theories of patent law 
take patent-enabled exclusivity as the relevant means for fixing a supply-side 
problem—the undersupply of private investment in the production of patentable 
subject matter or in the development and commercialization of patentable subject 
matter that would occur in the absence of patent-enabled exclusivity.  Put another 
way, patents attract private investment to productive activities that might 
otherwise be less attractive investments.  The reason why is rather straightforward 
and well-understood.  Without patents, the fruits of the investments, intellectual 
fruit, would be too easily accessed and used by others without compensation to 
the original investor, thus undermining the incentive to invest in the first place.  
This is the standard public goods story that serves as the textbook explanation for 
why we have a patent system.
While the supply-side view of the role of patents is important, a view from the 
demand-side is needed to fully appreciate the role of patents in the university 
research context (and more generally) and to fully inform university decisions 
about the extent to and manner in which they participate in patenting and 
commercializing research.  Introducing patents into the university research 
system, along with a host of other initiatives aimed at tightening the relationship 
between universities and industry, is (primarily) aimed at increasing connectivity 
between university science and technology research systems and the demands of 
industry for both university research outputs (including research results and 
human capital) and upstream infrastructural capital necessary to produce such 
outputs.
*
 © 2005 Brett M. Frischmann.
†
 Assistant Professor of Law, Loyola University Chicago School of Law.  An earlier version of 
this essay was published as Commercializing University Research Systems in Economic 
Perspective: A View from the Demand Side, in 16 University Entrepreneurship and Technology 
Transfer: Process, Design, and Intellectual Property, Elsevier Science/JAI Press Series: Advances 
in the Study of Entrepreneurship, Innovation, and Economic Growth (2005).  The author thanks 
Julie Cohen, Mark Lemley, Kathy Strandburg, Spencer Waller, participants in the Colloquium on 
Entrepreneurship Education and Technology Transfer, held January 21-23, 2005 and sponsored by 
the Karl Eller Center of the University of Arizona and the Ewing Marion Kaufmann Foundation, 
participants in the Conference: W(h)ither the Middleman: The Role and Future of Intermediaries 
in the Information Age, Michigan State University-DCL College of Law, Apr. 7-9, 2005, and 
many other colleagues for comments and criticisms.  The author also thanks Yangsu Kim for her 
excellent research assistance. 
2In this essay, I explore how university science and technology research systems 
perform economically as infrastructural capital and explain how these systems 
generate social value.  I explain the dual role of patents in the university research 
context.  On the supply side, patents facilitate the transfer (or “push”) of 
university research to industry.  On the demand side, patents attract (or “pull”) 
university resources to meet industry demands.  I focus on the demand side 
dynamic and explain how “patent pull” in the university research context may 
lead to a slow and subtle shift in the allocation of critical infrastructure resources 
within universities.  I explore what this means for both universities and society, 
and conclude with some observations about how universities might approach 
these issues strategically.
Approaching the role of patents from the demand side is an entirely new 
enterprise, and it is critical to understanding the role of patents in the university 
context and more generally.  Thus, in conclusion, I also make a few suggestions 
about future avenues of research in this area.
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3I. INTRODUCTION
There are substantial, growing literatures debating the merits of
commercializing universities and university research.1 The legal and economic 
literatures in particular focus extensively on university research results, and most 
often on how research results are managed, developed, licensed, transferred, 
priced, and used.2 The use of patents within the university research system as a 
tool to encourage and indeed enable technology transfer, utilization and 
commercialization has been lauded by some as a major success and criticized by 
others as a major failure.  Those who claim success focus on increased rates of 
patenting, licensing and commercialization.3  Patents encourage and enable 
transactions; they serve as the focal point for researchers, technology transfer 
officers, lawyers, venture capitalists, entrepreneurs, engineers, marketers, and 
other participants in the commercialization process.  Without patents, the 
proponents argue, potentially valuable research languishes underutilized.4  On the 
1 Not surprisingly, different literatures approach the commercialization question from different 
perspectives, some focusing broadly on the university on the whole and others focusing more 
narrowly on university research. As a law professor who teaches and writes about the law and 
economics of intellectual property, I approach the debate, at least initially, from the legal and 
economic literatures and with a focus on the role of patents on university research.  As I explain 
below, however, I propose a new and important, intermediate level of analysis—in between 
university-focused and university research-focused—that considers commercialization of the 
university science and technology research system.  I do not delve into the literature on 
institutional resource allocation, which focuses on the allocation of resources among university 
departments.  See Cindy S. Volk et al., Models of Institutional Resource Allocation: Mission, 
Market, and Gender, 72 J. HIGHER EDUCATION 387 (2001).
2 The economic and legal literatures are voluminous. See, e.g., David C. Mowery, Richard R. 
Nelson, Bhaven N. Sampat and Arvids A. Ziedonis, IVORY TOWER AND INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION:  
UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER BEFORE AND AFTER THE BAYH-DOLE ACT
(2004); DEREK BOK, UNIVERSITIES IN THE MARKETPLACE, (Princeton University Press 2003); 
BRANSCOMB, ET AL., INDUSTRIALIZING KNOWLEDGE (1999); ETZKOWITZ, ET AL., CAPITALIZING 
KNOWLEDGE (1998); HENRY ETZKOWITZ, MIT AND THE RISE OF ENTREPRENEURIAL SCIENCE
(2002); GROSS, NEW IDEA FACTORY (2000); Ajay Agrawal, University-to-industry knowledge 
transfer:  literature review and unanswered questions, I.J.M.R. (Dec. 2001); Cohen, W., R. 
Florida, L. Randazzese, and J. Walsh, Industry and the Academy: Uneasy Partners in the Cause of 
Technological Advance, in CHALLENGES TO THE RESEARCH UNIVERSITY (R. Noll, ed., 1998); 
Rebecca Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 
YALE L. J. 177 (1987);  Rebecca Eisenberg, Patenting the Human Genome, 39 EMORY L. J. 721 
(1990); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development:  Patents and 
Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663 (1996); Arti Rai, 
Regulating Scientific Research; Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. 
L. REV. 77 (1999); Brett Frischmann, Innovation and Institutions: Rethinking the Economics of 
U.S. Science and Technology Policy, 24 VT. L. REV. 347 (2000); F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights 
and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697 (2001); J.H. Reichman 
& Paul F. Uhlir, A Contractually Reconstructed Commons For Scientific Data in a Highly 
Protectionist Intellectual Property Environment, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 315 (2003).
3 See generally BOK, supra note 2 (arguing that the Bayh-Dole Act and patents enabled 
universities to do a better job serving the public interest).  
4 See id.; Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules, supra note 2 (arguing that the primary role of 
patents is to facilitate commercialization).  
4other hand, those who claim failure focus on transaction costs, patent “thickets,” 
deadweight losses, increased costs to the public, increased secrecy, and shifts in 
academic norms.5  Patents, they argue, are unnecessary impediments to 
widespread, competitive utilization of research results that the public already has 
paid for.6
This debate is by no means resolved.  Its resolution will depend upon 
continued empirical testing of the various types of costs and benefits that each 
side has highlighted. Moreover, the strength of the arguments offered by each side 
will vary considerably across research areas (for example, compare computer 
science, biotechnology and materials science) and across research result types (for
example, compare upstream basic research, midstream research tools, and 
downstream commercial technology).7 With the exception of some discussion of 
academic norms, most of the attention in this debate within the legal literature is
focused on research results—the outputs from the research process.8
In this essay, I shift focus away from the management of outputs.  That is, 
I will not address the arguments noted above about whether patents improve or 
worsen dissemination and use of university research results. Instead, I focus on 
the manner in which patents affect (i) the type or nature of the outputs produced;
(ii) the process of research and other related university-based processes; and 
mostly, even further upstream, (iii) the university science and technology research 
system itself.  As explained in more detail below, 
university science and technology (S&T) research system refers to 
the system of complementary university resources—financial, 
governance, human, intellectual, and physical capital resources—
that together act as inputs into different types of productive 
processes—including research, education, training, and 
socialization—that generate a wide range of socially valuable 
research outputs—intellectual and human capital (research results 
and skilled people).
5 See Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights, supra note 2; see also Eisenberg, Patenting the Human 
Genome, supra note 2, at 738 (discussing the possible costs and benefits of providing patents for 
publicly funded research of human genomes); Rai, Regulating Scientific Research, supra note 2, 
at 88;  Reichman & Uhlir, A Contractually Reconstructed Commons, supra note 2, at 320 
(recognizing increased intellectual property rights discourage traditional sharing of scientific 
findings).
6 See Frischmann, Innovation and Institutions, supra note 2; see also Brett Frischmann & Mark 
Lemley, Spillovers, Working Paper (2005) (discussing the advantages of widespread competitive 
utilization over coordination).
7 See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1600-
15 (2003) (discussing how different theories are more relevant to different industries depending on 
a particular industry’s needs and capabilities).  
8 See Brett Frischmann, A Process-oriented View of Intellectual Property, Working Paper (2005-
06) (arguing that intellectual property law and scholarship tends to be “output-focused” and pays 
insufficient attention to the intellectual processes that yield outputs).
5While patent scholars debate the impact of patents on the management of 
university research, they pay scant attention to potential impacts of patents on the 
university research system itself.  This essay, by contrast, draws attention to the 
role of patents in commercializing the university S&T research system.
Given limits in government funding of research, universities have begun 
to pursue and employ patents aggressively to transfer technology, encourage 
entrepreneurship and generate revenues that may support research efforts. While 
some universities have found tremendous success in pursuing commercial 
avenues, the vast majority have not.9  Yet many still continue to make 
participation in the patenting and commercialization process a priority.10
Universities face incredibly difficult, complex decisions concerning the 
degree to which they ought to participate in commercialization of research.11
While limited government funds may be the immediate, most visible factor 
forcing such decisions upon universities,12 there are more fundamental forces at 
work.  In Academic Capitalism,13 Sheila Slaughter and Larry Leslie present a 
compelling argument that globalization, changing economic conditions, and other 
macro-level factors are increasing pressure on universities on the whole to behave 
more and more like market actors.  
Another (complementary) explanation can be found in the dominant 
economic mindset that has emerged in the past few decades.  This mindset 
9 See Jay Kesan, Tech-Transfer Offices As Intermediaries (On Their Own Terms), Working paper, 
presented at W(h)ither the Middleman: The Role and Future of Intermediaries in the Information 
Age, Michigan State University College of Law, April 8-9, 2005, East Lansing, Michigan 
(analyzing success rates and trends in patenting behavior at U.S. universities); Aldo Geuna & 
Lionel Nesta, University patenting and its effects on academic research. The emerging European 
evidence, RESEARCH POLICY (forthcoming 2005) (analyzing success rates and trends in patenting 
behavior at European universities).
10 See Kesan, supra; NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION REPORT, ACADEMIC PATENTING: PATENTS 
AWARDED TO U.S. UNIVERSITIES, (1996), available at
http://www.nsf.gov/sbe/srs/seind96/ch5_acad.htm (same); Rebecca Henderson, et al., Universities 
as a Source of Commercial Technology:  A Detailed Analysis of University Patenting, 1965-1988, 
80 REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS 119 (1996).
11 See SHEILA SLAUGHTER & LARRY LESLIE, ACADEMIC CAPITALISM (1997); James Stuart, The 
Academic-Industrial Complex: A Warning to Universities, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 1011, 1042 
(2004); see generally Jennifer Croissant & Sal Restivo, DEGREES OF COMPROMISE:  INDUSTRIAL 
INTEREST AND ACADEMIC VALUES (SUNY Press 2001).
12
 Committee on Trends in Federal Spending on Scientific and Engineering Research, Board on 
Science, Technology and Economic Policy, National Research Council, TRENDS IN FEDERAL 
SUPPORT OF RESEARCH AND GRADUATE EDUCATION, 21-44 (2001), National Academies Press, 
available at http://www.nap.edu/nap-cgi/skimit.cgi?isbn=0309075890&chap=21-48; see also The 
NSF Budget: How Should We Determine Future Levels?: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Res. 
Committee. on Sci. House of Rep., 107th Cong. 107-62 (2002) 11-13 (discussing the drop in 
funding for the National Science Foundation).  
13 SLAUGHTER & LARRY LESLIE, supra note 11.
6focuses on the perceived social benefits of commercialization, privatization and 
deregulation, on minimizing government intervention in markets, and arguably on 
maximizing market intervention into government and academia, although 
proponents of such increased reliance on the market mechanism would not put it 
this way.14  As Paul Krugman recently noted, “Decades of conservative marketing 
have convinced Americans that government programs always create bloated 
bureaucracies, while the private sector is always lean and efficient.”15  In my 
opinion, universities often are typecast like government in a manner that 
marginalizes their social and economic contributions and their respective roles in 
society.  Along with a glorified view of the market and a pessimistic view of 
government, universities are cast as ivory tower havens for (liberal) academics out 
of touch with reality and the demands of society.  
This is not the place to develop these arguments fully, but I raise them to 
suggest that the commercialization question is not unique to the university
research context but rather is endemic to evolving notions of modern societal 
organization in capitalist economies.16  To grapple with the commercialization 
question, universities should step back from their immediate context, compare 
their situation with that of other industries and social contexts, reflect on their role 
in society, and proceed carefully.
In this essay, I explore how university science and technology research 
systems perform economically as infrastructural capital, explain how these 
systems generate value, and help reframe the commercialization question.  I 
explain the subtle demand-side role of patents in the university science and 
technology research system and how the availability of patents , coupled with 
scarce government funding, may lead to a creeping systemic optimization—a 
slow and subtle shift in the allocation of infrastructure resources and research 
14
 In his book, MIT and the Rise of Entrepreneurial Science, Henry Etzkowitz suggests that 
“reorient[ing] the universities toward a commercial role was not intervention in the sense of 
specific government measures requiring targeting of particular areas of R&D for support, as in 
Japan, or requiring enterprises and research institutes to make research contracts with each other, 
as in the Eastern European socialist model.  Instead, incentives were built into the research-
funding system to move universities closer to industry, in their motivation and structure.” 
ETZKOWITZ, MIT AND THE RISE OF ENTREPRENEURIAL SCIENCE, supra note 2, at 125.  Etzkowitz 
is reassured that the government is not overtly intervening into academia, but fails to appreciate 
fully the risks of industry intervention, which I discuss below.
15 Buying Into Failure, NY Times, Op. Ed. (Dec. 17, 2004).
16 In three previous articles, I have argued that the dominant economic mindset ignores critical 
social and economic values and that over-reliance on the market mechanism may involve 
significant social (opportunity) costs that escape consideration within conventional economic 
analyses.  In these articles, I used the tools of the economics discipline to challenge the dominant 
economic mindset as it pertains to specific areas.  See Frischmann, Innovation and Institutions: 
supra note 2; Brett Frischmann, Privatization and Commercialization of the Internet 
Infrastructure: Rethinking Market Intervention into Government and Government Intervention 
into the Market, 2 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 51 (June 8, 2001) at 
http://www.stlr.org/cite.cgi?volume=2&article=1 (last visited Dec. 14, 2004); Brett Frischmann, 
An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons Management, 89 MINN. L. REV. 917 (2005).
7priorities.  This optimization is not simply an adjustment in incentives, an 
“incentive shift” for researchers to “better” align their incentives with the 
commercialization objective and thereby encourage more efficient technology 
transfer, which boils down to more efficient supply of university derived 
technology to downstream commercial markets.  While this is part of the 
dynamic, it is critical that universities take a wider view and recognize the 
demand-side effects of commercialization.  
The role of patents in the university research context (and the 
commercialization question more generally) is not simply about using patent-
enabled exclusivity to fix the supply-side problem of underutilization of 
government funded research results; it is also if not primarily about increasing 
connectivity between university science and technology research systems and the 
demands of industry for both university research outputs (research results and 
human capital) and the infrastructural capital necessary to generating those 
outputs.
The U.S. government has made an explicit policy decision to allow funded 
entities to obtain patents and thereby has encouraged participation in the 
commercialization of federally funded research.  The Bayh-Dole Act17 enables 
universities to participate in the commercialization process, but it does not 
obligate or constrain them to pursue any particular strategy with respect to 
federally funded research.18  Universities must decide carefully the extent to 
which they wish to participate in the commercialization process.19  As Richard 
Florida has argued, “universities need to be more vigilant in managing the 
process” and should “reconsider their more aggressive policies toward technology 
transfer and particularly regarding the ownership of intellectual property.”20
Universities remain in the driver’s seat and may decide which road to take and at 
what speed.
The remainder of the essay is organized as follows:  Part II discusses 
university science and technology research systems and explains how they 
perform economically [as infrastructural capital].  Part III explains how patents 
were introduced based on “supply-side” reasoning without due care for “demand-
side” issues.  It then describes how patents create a demand-pull for optimization 
created by market-driven incentives in the university research context.  Part IV 
suggests that universities have a choice and must carefully decide on the degree to 
which they participate in commercialization.  Part V concludes.
17
 Bayh-Dole University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 
3019 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200Œ 211) (2000).
18 C.f. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development, supra note 2, at 1700 (noting that 
university support for the Bayh-Dole Act was in part due to their ability to control their 
interactions with commercial entities).   
19 See Rai, supra note 2.
20 Richard Florida, The Role of the University:  Leveraging Talent, Not Technology, SCIENCE AND 
TECHNOLOGY ONLINE (Summer 1999), at http://www.isues.org/issues/15.4/florida.htm. 
8II. UNIVERSITY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY RESEARCH SYSTEMS
A university science and technology research system is a system of 
productive resources aggregated within a university setting and used to produce a 
stream of research-related outputs.21  The system is comprised of at least five 
different sets of related, complementary resources, including:
1. human capital, including complementary networks of people such as 
professors, researchers, students, administrators, technicians, and other 
support staff;22
2. governance capital, such as rules, norms, policies and other collective 
constraints that guide system participants’ behavior; 
3. physical capital, such as land, facilities and equipment;
4. intellectual capital, such as knowledge, information, and ideas;23 and
5. financial capital.  
Each of these capital resources is an essential component of the system, although 
the bundle of such resources and manner in which they are bundled varies 
considerably across universities.  I have referred to the various components of the 
system as capital because, aggregated together within a university, these 
resources are used collectively and continuously as inputs into a variety of 
production processes, including research, education, training, and socialization, 
among others.  
[insert Figure One (at the end)]
These production processes yield a wide variety of research-related 
outputs, which can be grouped into two major categories—intellectual capital and 
human capital.  Intellectual capital outputs24 are the intangible information goods, 
21
 Of course, these resources also produce other important outputs as well, e.g., educated citizens. 
22
 Florida focuses on the importance of attracting and aggregating human capital within the 
university science and technology system as a means of improving its performance.  He notes that 
universities must attract the “top talent,” referring to academic research professors, in order to 
attract the top graduate students.  Florida emphasizes the need to shift our myopic focus on 
research results (e.g., university derived invention) to human capital, in terms of both human 
capital outputs and human capital as a component of infrastructural capital.  See Florida, The Role 
of the University, supra note 20.
23
 The intellectual capital category is meant to capture the full range of intangible products of the 
human intellect, regardless of whether the product has been fixated in a tangible medium (i.e., 
written down) and regardless of whether any particular entity claims ownership of the intellectual 
good.  Intellectual capital often overlaps significantly with human capital.  For example, the idea 
residing in the mind of a professor is an intellectual resource while the professor is a human 
capital resource.  
24
 I recognize that the term “capital outputs” seems like an oxymoron, but it is not.  It is important 
to realize that capital goods are produced and thus are outputs of a production process, especially 
when evaluating streams of cumulative input-output relationships.
9essentially the research results, which may or may not be embedded in some 
artifact (e.g., equipment design), be fixated in some tangible form (e.g., written 
down), or simply reside in the minds of researchers.  Generally, when we refer to 
“science,” “research,” “invention,” “innovation,” “technology,” and so on, we are 
talking about various types of intellectual capital that are outputs from some 
intellectual process.  These outputs are public goods with varying potential to 
yield positive externalities (or conversely, appropriable benefits) when utilized 
productively further downstream.  The types of downstream uses may vary 
considerably, and so can the variance itself.25
Equally if not more important than pure intellectual capital outputs—
research results—are human capital outputs—people with (a) higher levels of 
education, knowledge, experience, and research-oriented skills (b) who are 
prepared for entry into the research community.26  The importance of human 
capital outputs is well-understood.  Many commentators, such as Richard Florida, 
have emphasized the critical role of U.S. universities in educating and training 
(graduate) students—in creating “talent” that fuels the knowledge economy.  
Education, knowledge, experience, and research-oriented skills must be absorbed 
by students and consequently often are standard (in contrast with the cutting edge 
nature of the research result outputs).  Once absorbed through the processes of 
research, education and training, the intellectual capital residing within the 
university science and technology research system is disseminated and shared.  
Thus, research-oriented education, knowledge, experience, and skills may be 
viewed as forms of intellectual capital that are disseminated to students and used 
productively to augment their human capital. 
Both intellectual and human capital outputs generate value when used 
productively as inputs downstream.  As Figure Two illustrates, “downstream” use 
of these outputs may entail use in further research (internally or externally) or use 
in commercialization processes (internally or externally).  
25 See Frischmann, Innovation and Institutions, supra note 2. 
26
 It is important to realize that socialization is an important aspect of the university science and 
technology research system.  Students are prepared for entry into the research community, for 
example, by gaining familiarity with professional norms and ethics and forming relationships with 
members of the community.  Most undergraduate or graduate students have limited real-world 
experience and very little (if any) experience in dealing with professionals as a member of the 
professional community.  In law school, for example, we place a significant emphasis on the fact 
that students will be entering a profession, that they will be members of the bar, and that a host of 
ethical and even less formal community norms apply to members.  The law school experience, in 
part, consists of a socialization process that prepares the students for professional membership.  A 
very similar dynamic exists within the university research setting, although it is less explicit and 
less formal than in the law school setting.  Katherine Strandburg has indirectly touched on this 
dynamic.  She explores the relationships between community norms and academic scientists’ 
individual preferences.  See Katherine Strandburg, Curiosity-driven research and university 
technology transfer, in 16 UNIVERSITY ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: 
PROCESS, DESIGN, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, ELSEVIER SCIENCE/JAI PRESS SERIES: 
ADVANCES IN THE STUDY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH (2005).
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[insert figure two (at the end)]
For the most part, then, universities are “vertically integrated” with respect to the 
production of research systems and research-related outputs; some outputs are 
consumed internally while others are consumed externally.  The manner in which 
the outputs are used depends, of course, on the nature of the specific outputs.
Viewed as an integrated system of complementary resources that generate 
value primarily when used to produce a stream of research-related outputs, the 
university science and technology research system begins to look like other forms 
of infrastructural capital.27
University science and technology research systems are “sharable” in the 
sense that multiple users may access and use the system resources to engage in 
productive processes and produce research-related outputs.28  Some components 
of the system have infinite capacity (i.e., are purely nonrival in consumption)—
such as intellectual and governance capital—while others have finite capacity 
(i.e., are rival in consumption)—such as physical, financial, and human capital.  It 
is the scarcity of these latter types of capital resources that drives both 
competition for funding and prestige and resource allocation decisions. As 
discussed below, to some extent, the rivalrousness29 of the system is what puts 
pressure on universities to optimize the system for commercial outputs because 
the appropriable benefits (revenues) generated by such outputs may provide the 
resources necessary to sustain the system.  (More on this dynamic below.)
University science and technology research systems, like road systems, 
basic research, the Internet and many infrastructures,30 are socially valuable 
primarily because of the productive activity they facilitate downstream.  In other 
words, the value created by these research systems is only realized when the 
27 See Frischmann, Economic Theory of Infrastructure, supra note 16 (on different types of 
infrastructure capital).
28 See id., at 956-57, 959 (explaining the economic significance of this characteristic); Brett M. 
Frischmann, Peer-to-Peer Technology as Infrastructure: An Economic Argument For Retaining 
Sony's Safe Harbor For Technologies Capable of Substantial Noninfringing Uses, 52 J. 
COPYRIGHT SOCIETY 329, 332-33 (2005) (same); see also Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, 
Linux and the Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369 (2002) (on a particular class of sharable 
goods); Yochai Benkler, Sharing Nicely: On shareable goods and the emergence of sharing as a 
modality of economic production,  114 YALE L.J. 273 (2005).
29 See Jonathan M. Barnett, Private Protection of Patentable Goods, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1251, 
1257 (2004) (Barnett describes the “first-mover” concept in which the first party to develop a new 
innovation employs different economic tactics to maintain its market monopoly).  See also
Katherine Strandburg, What Does the Public Get?  Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain, 
2004 WIS. L. REV. 81, 85-6 (2004) (Strandburg explains that due to the Bayh-Dole Act and the 
relationship between federally funded researchers and private actors “provides opportunities for 
strategic behavior, such as firms’ placing of particular research projects into the nonprofit sector 
so as to gain access to the patented technology of competitors.”)  
30 Frischmann, Economic Theory of Infrastructure, supra note 16.
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research-related outputs are used downstream; essentially, the “value added” is 
embedded in the outputs.  Accordingly, to fully understand the social demand for 
this type of infrastructure and to assess how well demand signals “manifest” 
upstream,31 it is necessary to evaluate the output markets in terms of the nature of 
the outputs produced, the extent to which such outputs generate (non)observable 
and (non)appropriable value, and the manner in which value is distributed (for 
example, is value realized only by consumers or are there external benefits to 
nonconsumers).
Most university science and technology research systems served mixed
commercial, public, and social ends by enabling the downstream production of a 
wide variety of private, public, and non-market goods.  As a general matter, 
university science and technology research systems do not directly yield private 
goods for commercial markets (except to the extent that one takes the view that 
human capital outputs constitute rival goods consumed in the labor market), 
although these systems generate human and intellectual capital that may be used 
externally to produce such goods. 
University science and technology research systems produce a wide array 
of public and non-markets goods that generate (or have the potential to generate) 
significant positive externalities.  This should not be a controversial point.  It is 
important to realize, however, that the human and intellectual capital outputs of 
these systems have varying potentials to yield positive externalities and, 
conversely, appropriable benefits. This variance can be understood in a few ways.  
For a moment, put aside human capital outputs32 and focus on intellectual capital 
outputs—research results that are pure public goods.  The research results may 
vary in terms of their genericness-specificity with respect to applications 
downstream—that is, they may vary along the basic to applied continuum.33  The 
research results also may vary in terms of the classes of applications—for 
example, commercial, private goods production or noncommercial research.  Both 
types of variance affect the potential for positive externalities and appropriable 
benefits.  
31
 I discuss demand manifestation below and extensively in An Economic Theory of Infrastructure 
and Commons Management.  See id.
32
 Human capital outputs also may exhibit variance in the potential to generate positive 
externalities.  To see how, consider the various production processes within the university science 
and technology research system that “produce” human capital outputs—specifically, research, 
education, training, and socialization.  
33
 J. H. Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, A Contractually Reconstructed Research Commons for 
Scientific Data in a Highly Protectionist Intellectual Property Environment, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 315, 332 (2003) (Federal grants for basic research is one method by which such 
government-funded research “enter[s] the upstream processes of scientific research as an input 
available from the public domain.”)
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As a general matter, most universities do not allocate their infrastructural 
capital on the basis of commercial prospects in output markets.34  Consequently, 
the range of outputs from university science and technology research systems has 
not historically been weighted more heavily towards commercial research.  This is 
not to say that universities have not made significant contributions in the realm of 
commercial research—of course, they have35—but rather commercial applications 
have not generally been a central objective or priority.  Put another way, industry 
demand for commercializable research has not driven universities’ resource 
allocation decisions—at least, historically.
By the same token, again historically, government research funding has 
not been weighted more heavily towards specific commercial ends.36  Yet, at 
times, government-funding has yielded research with commercial applications, 
and, as the history behind the Bayh-Dole Act tells us,37 such research was 
(allegedly) underutilized.38  To solve this problem of underutilized government-
funded research, intellectual property took on a new role, to which I now turn.39
III. THE ROLE OF PATENTS IN UNIVERSITY RESEARCH SYSTEMS
There are many competing theories, justifications, and explanations for the 
existence of intellectual property law.  The dominant economic justification for 
patents outside the university research context is that granting patents over 
34 As Auerswald and Branscomb note, researchers tend to allocate their resources—time, money,
graduate student assistance, etc.—according to their “interest in the question posed” which 
“contrast[s] sharply with a decision rule based on commercial potential.”  Philip E. Auerswald & 
Lewis M. Branscomb, Start-ups and Spin-offs:  Collective Entrepreneurship Between Invention 
and Innovation, in THE EMERGENCE OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP POLICY 61, 79-80 (Ed., David M. Hart 
2003).  They also note:  “A fundamental challenge involved in taking a project from invention to 
innovation is accomplishing the shift from decisions based on the criterion of ‘interestingness’ to 
one based on the criterion of commercial value.”  
35 See, e.g., Rebecca Henderson, et al., Universities as a Source of Commercial Technology:  A 
Detailed Analysis of University Patenting, 1965-1988, 80 REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
119 (1996).
36 Traditionally, federal research funding has primarily been mission-oriented.  See DONNA 
FOSSUM ET AL., VITAL ASSETS:  FEDERAL INVESTMENT IN RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AT THE 
NATION’S UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES 2 (RAND 2004).  Recent studies suggest that federal 
R&D funds have become increasingly concentrated.  Id. at 12 (recent increases in R&D funding to 
universities and colleges has been highly focused on medical research).
37 See David C. Mowery, Richard R. Nelson, Bhaven N. Sampat and Arvids A. Ziedonis, IVORY 
TOWER AND INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION:  UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER BEFORE 
AND AFTER THE BAYH-DOLE ACT (2004).
38 See Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development, supra note 2, at 1702 (discussing and 
critiquing the argument that federally funded research was underutilized); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, 
Technology Transfer and the Genome Project: Problems with Patenting Research Tools, 5 RISK 
163, 163 (1994); Frischmann, Innovation and Institutions, supra note 2, at 406.
39 But see Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules, supra note 2 (arguing that the primary role 
of patents is to facilitate commercialization).
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inventions provides the necessary incentive for private investment in creating the 
inventions in the first place—call this the reward (or incentive) theory.40
Information resources face the well-known supply-side problem, common to 
public goods:  the inability to (cheaply) exclude competitors and nonpaying 
consumers (free-riders) presents a risk to investors perceived ex ante (prior to 
production of the good), which may lead to undersupply.41 Essentially, in the 
absence of patent law, there would be a significant underinvestment in invention 
because of the risk that competitors would appropriate the value of the invention.  
Granting inventors patents lessens the costs of exclusion, raises the costs of free-
riding, encourages licensing, and, as a result, makes a greater portion of the 
surplus generated by the invention appropriable by the inventor.
In the university research context, patents have these same effects, but 
where research is funded by government, the economic justification is quite 
different.42  Simply put, awarding patents for government funded research is 
premised on the notion that patents are necessary to facilitate post-patent research, 
development and commercialization—call this the commercialization (or 
prospect) theory.43  That is, in the absence of patents, government funded research 
results would languish underutilized (underdeveloped and undercommercialized) 
because (1) the researchers and their host institutions lacked the incentives and/or 
capacity to further develop and commercialize the research or to transfer the 
research results to industry, and (2) even if transfer was feasible, industry lacked 
sufficient incentives to invest in development and commercialization without the 
exclusivity made available by patents in the form of exclusive licenses. Elsewhere 
I have questioned the strength of these arguments and argued that the classes of 
research results for which these arguments justify patents may be quite limited.44
40 See, e.g., MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 119 (3d. 
ed. 2003); Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 
1031, 1031 (2005).
41
 For a certain subset of patentable subject matter, trade secrecy or other mechanisms may 
provide sufficient means for appropriating surplus to attract private investment into production.  
For this subset, patents may be justified for a variety of reasons associated with disclosure.  See
Strandburg, What Does the Public Get, supra note 29.
42
 I am concerned in this paper with government funded research.  Of course, a significant amount 
of university research is funded through other means. See also Peter D. Blumberg, From “Publish 
or Perish” to “Profit or Perish”: Revenues from University Technology Transfer and the S 
501(c)(3) Tax Exemption, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 89, 99-100 (1996) (Blumberg details how income 
from university research and technology transfer would be affected if a corporate tax rate were 
imposed on universities for their work with private actors). 
43 While the prospect and commercialization theories of patent law are technically distinct and 
have slightly different foci, they share the same theoretical and practical orientation.  See Edmund 
W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 276 (1977) 
(prospect theory); Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules, supra note 2 (commercialization 
theory); Shubha Ghosh, Patents and the Regulatory State:  Rethinking the Patent Bargain 
Metaphor After Eldred, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1315, 1353-57 (2004) (noting that prospect and 
commercialization theories derive from the theoretical work of Demsetz); see also Frischmann & 
Lemley, Spillovers, supra note 6 (critiquing the Demsetzian approach to intellectual property).
44 See Frischmann, Innovation and Institutions, supra note 2. 
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Rather than rehash the arguments and counterarguments, which as noted in the 
introduction are the subject of continued debate, let me instead assume for 
purposes of argument that the federal policy of allowing federally funded 
researchers to patent the research results is warranted.  After all, as also noted 
earlier, the law only encourages and enables, but does not require, university 
patenting and participation in commercialization.  
Most analyses of the role of patents in the university research context 
focus on the exclusivity of patents:  that is, the benefits of exclusivity—increased 
appropriation of surplus; increased technology transfer, licensing and related 
transactions; increased commercialization; and so on; and the costs of 
exclusivity—deadweight losses, increased transaction costs, patent thickets, and 
so on.  It is important to keep in mind that the benefits and costs of exclusivity are 
felt differently by different constituencies within a university and thus may lead to 
internal conflicts.
Exclusivity is a supply-side concern that is relevant to assessing how well 
markets will function.45  Patents improve exclusion and consequently the supply-
side functioning of markets for university research results as well as those markets 
further downstream for derivative commercial end-products.  Both the reward and 
commercialization theories of patent law take patent-enabled exclusivity as the 
relevant means for fixing a supply-side problem—essentially, the undersupply of 
private investment in the production of patentable subject matter or in the 
development and commercialization of patentable subject matter that would occur 
in the absence of patent-enabled exclusivity.  The theories differ largely in terms 
of where in the supply chain patent-enabled exclusivity is needed and of the 
degree of control/exclusivity needed to attract investment.  
Patent theories take as a given that the market mechanism will best 
aggregate information regarding demand for such investment.  Put in a slightly 
different way, the theories are premised on the notion that private investment into 
the production, development and commercialization of patentable subject matter 
will be allocated efficiently on the basis of expected returns in downstream 
commercial markets, so long as patents are available to provide the necessary 
45
 Excludability is relevant to a supply-side analysis of whether markets will work efficiently. 
(Low cost) exclusion is one key to a well-functioning market.  If one can (cheaply) exclude others 
from consuming a resource, one can demand payment as a condition for access. If one cannot 
(cheaply) exclude others from consuming a resource, then the market may fail to satisfy consumer 
demand for the resource (undersupply) because suppliers will not be able to recoup their costs 
from consumers. Simply put, a producer of a good needs must exclude you from consuming the 
good it has produced if it wishes to charge you for access and consumption. Further, a producer of 
a good needs to be able to charge you for access if it wishes to recover its costs. If the costs of 
exclusion are high, then producers must either sink these additional costs and charge higher fees, 
or run the risk that consumers will “free ride” (i.e., consume the good without paying). Either 
route may lead to market failure. Thus, if market provision of a resource is desirable  but the costs 
of exclusion are too high, then government intervention to “fix” the market may be appropriate.
15
exclusivity.46  This certainly makes good sense, so long as we are talking about 
private profit-driven investment.  But what if investment is not entirely private?  
What if demand for research-related outputs and the allocation of 
infrastructural capital to the production of such outputs is not determined 
accurately by the market mechanism on the basis of expected returns in 
downstream commercial markets?  What if demand is assessed more efficiently 
by non-market processes—involving government, non-profits, or community 
organizations, for example?47  What if we are talking about public or community 
investment rather than private investment?
As noted above, university science and technology research systems 
produce a mix of outputs, some of which may have commercial application, many 
of which do not.  How, if at all, does the availability of patents in the university 
research context affect demand for university science and technology research 
system resources?  
In An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons Management, I 
explain the concept of demand manifestation, which basically concerns how well 
consumer demand for infrastructure-dependent outputs translates into demand for 
infrastructure in the upstream market.  Markets may under-represent social 
demand for infrastructure where output producers fail to observe or appropriate 
value in output markets. Put another way, the market mechanism exhibits a 
predictable bias in favor of outputs that generate observable and appropriable 
benefits; to the extent that infrastructure access or infrastructure capital is scarce, 
relying on the market mechanism to indicate demand for access or capital may 
lead to undersupply of socially desired outputs—specifically, public goods and 
non-market goods that yield positive externalities. 48
In the past, universities had not directed their resources toward the 
production of commercial outputs for a variety of reasons—public interest 
missions, an explicit focus on education of citizenry, the “ivory tower” metaphor 
46 See Jack E. Kerrigan & Christopher J. Brasco, The Technology Transfer Revolution: Legislative 
History and Future Proposals, 31 PUB. CONT. L. J. 277, 281-82 (2002) (The Stevenson-Wydler 
Act led to the development of the Cooperative Research and Development Agreement, 
(“CRADA”), which authorized collaborative agreements between federal laboratories and 
universities.  CRADA also led to the Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986, whereby 
government scientists and private industry could benefit from entering into CRADAs).
47 See Frischmann, Economic Theory of Infrastructure, supra note 16; Strandburg, Curiosity 
Driven Research, supra note 26;Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and the Nature of the 
Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369 (2002) (comparing market, state, and commons based production as 
information processing systems).
48 See Frischmann, Economic Theory of Infrastructure, supra note 16 (explaining this dynamic); 
see also Rebecca Eisenberg, Patents and Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental 
Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1033 (1989) (discussing a study by Edwin Mansfield which found 
that private rates of return were almost half that of the social rates of return such that in hindsight, 
private firms would not have invested in research and development of the innovation despite the 
social benefits that were ultimately realized). 
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and the ideal of insulation from market or government influence, and so on.  
Another important reason is that universities had not always been able to 
appropriate the benefits of commercially viable research in the absence of patent 
protection.  
Arguably, the obstacles that patents were introduced to overcome—
insufficient incentives and capacity to develop and commercialize research 
results—may have acted as an important buffer between the university science 
and technology research system and the marketplace.  This is not to say that 
universities and industry did not interact.  To the contrary, as David Mowery 
demonstrates, universities and industry have a long history of interactions.49
Clearly, the buffer has been permeable over time, but (arguably) it may have been 
sufficient to insulate system management and resource allocation decisions from 
the demands of downstream commercial markets. 
Although universities were vertically integrated in the sense that they 
produced both the infrastructure and the outputs, the infrastructure remained 
generic and the outputs remained mixed because the appropriability of surplus 
downstream was not a driving factor in the allocation of infrastructural capital.  
Introducing patents into the system, along with a host of other initiatives aimed at 
tightening the relationship between universities and industry, may change the 
dynamic in a relatively predictable manner. 
Demand for university-produced commercial research manifests in 
market-driven transactions made possible by patents (e.g., licenses) and critically, 
through other university-industry relationships, such an industry sponsorship of 
research.50  This creates a demand-pull that, at the margins, may lead to the 
creeping optimization of the infrastructure.51  In a realm of limited, scarce 
resources and robust competition for prestige, students, and funding, university 
49
 Mowery shows that the trend of increased patenting behavior by universities occurred prior to 
1980 and the passage of Bayh-Dole.  He also suggests that while the relationship between 
universities and industry may have evolved (been transformed) in the past few decades, 
transformation should not be attributed to the Bayh-Dole Act itself. See David Mowery, The 
Bayh-Dole Act and High-Technology Entrepreneurship in U.S. Universities: Chicken, Egg, or 
Something Else?, in 16 UNIVERSITY ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: PROCESS, 
DESIGN, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, ELSEVIER SCIENCE/JAI PRESS SERIES: ADVANCES IN THE 
STUDY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH (2005).  
50 See Strandburg, Curiosity Driven Research, supra note 26 (discussing industry sponsorship of 
research and noting this effect); Michael S. Mireles, An Examination of Patents, Licensing, 
Research Tools, and the Tragedy of the Anti-Commons in Biotechnology Innovation, 38 U. MICH. 
J.L. REFORM 141, 144-45 (2004) (same); see also Reichman & Uhlir, A Contractually 
Reconstructed Research Commons, supra note 2, at 341-43 (noting that commercial exploitation 
of university research may pressure universities to “hoard” and protect information).
51 This is similar to the current debate over the end-to-end architecture of the Internet, although the 
optimization question is much more explicit and immediate in that context.  Frischmann, 
Economic Theory of Infrastructure, supra note 16, at Pt. IV.  
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decisions52 about how to allocate upstream infrastructure capital to downstream 
production may be biased toward output markets that generate appropriable 
returns at the expense of those that generate positive externalities.53
As I argue at greater length elsewhere,54 the market mechanism exhibits a 
bias for outputs that generate observable and appropriable benefits at the expense 
of outputs that generate positive externalities.  This is not surprising because the 
whole point of relying on exclusivity—whether provided by traditional property 
rights or patents—is to enable private appropriation and discourage externalities.  
The problem with relying on the market mechanism is that potential positive 
externalities may remain unrealized if they cannot be easily valued and 
appropriated by those that produce them, even though society as a whole may be 
better off if those potential externalities were actually produced.55
The market mechanism exhibits other biases as well.  For instance, 
because private discount rates tend to be higher than social discount rates, markets 
tend to be biased toward the short term.  Among other things, the divergence 
between private and social discount rates can lead to overinvestment in applied 
research and commensurate underinvestment in basic research.56  Further, 
incumbent market actors may act strategically to preserve their market positions 
or to control the direction of innovation.57  These two biases introduce further 
52
 A critical question to consider is who allocates these resources.  Kathy Strandburg focuses on 
the preferences of basic researchers and the differences between homo economicus and homo 
scientificus. See Strandburg, Curiosity Driven Research, supra note 26.  I wonder (1) whether 
basic researchers are making allocation decisions (I think, no), and (2) whether it is a question of 
nature vs. nurture – will scientists evolve?  Will changes in the environment lead to slow subtle 
changes in the species?  These are difficult questions that require further study.
53
 An empirical study of the allocation of infrastructure capital resources of the types identified 
above is needed.  The datasets that would useful include, among other things, time spent by 
faculty and graduate students on different types of projects; factors in hiring, promotion and tenure 
of faculty; and allocation of physical capital such as labs and equipment to general purpose or 
dedicated commercial projects.
54 Frischmann, Economic Theory of Infrastructure, supra note 16.
55 See id.; see also Frischmann & Lemley, Spillovers, supra note 6 (explaining the benefits of 
letting the spillovers flow).
56
 This bias influences decisions about many infrastructure resources.  Id. As a general matter, it 
may lead to underinvestment in the maintenance and repair of existing infrastructure.  Similarly, it 
can lead to overconsumption of environmental resources in the present without due regard to the 
costs for future generations, or to technological optimization of the Internet in favor of existing or 
reasonably foreseeable applications to the potential detriment of yet-to-be-developed applications. 
Id.
57 See, e.g., Arti Rai & Rebecca Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine,
66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 296 (2003) (Noting that upstream patent may stunt subsequent 
research if the patent covers even basic research that would have enabled more development); 
Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 2, at 342 (In seeking opportunities in commercially marketable 
research results, universities may “commercialize upstream aggregates of data as research tools 
and products.”); Phillip Pardey, Bonwoo Koo, Carol Nottenburg, Creating, Protecting, and Using 
Crop Biotechnologies Worldwide in an Era of Intellectual Property, 6 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 
213, 225 (2004) (A shift in emphasis may occur away from basic research to applied research as 
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dynamic complications associated with path dependence and the costs of 
changing directions once a path has been taken.
As noted previously, university science and technology research systems 
are inputs into the production of a wide variety of research-related outputs that are 
used externally and internally to produce value downstream (which may actually 
involve internal cycling for continued use in the university science and 
technology research system).  There is a real risk that the biases of the market 
mechanism will “work their way upstream” and infect/affect university science 
and technology research systems.  The most obvious manner in which this 
dynamic can be expected to operate is simply by way of upstream resource 
allocation—in a world of scarce resources (particularly, physical, human, and 
financial capital), it should not be surprising to see an emerging preference for 
self-supportive activities that yield appropriable benefits that are fed back into the 
system.  As Reichman and Uhlir conclude, “under Bayh-Dole, universities have 
moved away from policies that favor pure research, both for its own sake and as a 
tool for advancing higher education.  As the costs of education skyrocket, and 
government funding fails to keep up in many areas, universities have aggressively 
sought to exploit commercial applications of research results, with an eye toward 
maximizing returns on investment.”58
Thus, introducing patents into the university research context is not solely 
about introducing exclusivity (with its benefits and costs) to fix a supply-side 
problem—underutilization, underdevelopment, and undercommercialization of 
research results.  Introducing patents into the university research context is also, if 
not primarily, about manifesting market-driven demand for university-produced 
research and more subtly for the infrastructural capital aggregated within 
university science and technology research systems.
This should not be surprising.  As it has become clearer that innovation is 
the engine driving the economy, we should expect pressure to optimize various 
institutions to support innovation policy.59  Should universities be optimized to 
supply innovation?  I think not, at least not as a matter of general public policy.60
universities look for more financially rewarding research); see also David C. Hoffman, A Modest 
Proposal: Toward Improved Access to Biotechnology Research Tools by Implementing a Broad 
Experimental Use Exception.  89 CORNELL L. REV. 993, 1025 (2004) (“As the biotechnology 
industry has diversified and become economically viable, the financial incentive provided by 
patents has motivated many academic scientists to shift their emphasis from basic to applied 
research.”).
58
 Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 52 at 341.
59 In fact, innovation theory drives similar optimization debates in other infrastructure industries.  
Frischmann, Economic Theory of Infrastructure, supra note 16, at Pt. IV (similar pressure to 
optimize the Internet infrastructure).
60
 Even if universities should be optimized to supply innovation, what exactly does that mean? 
How would such an objective be accomplished?  Assuming that promoting innovation were our 
sole policy objective, it is not clear what the optimal role of universities would be.  The current 
trend reflects one of many possibilities.  Specifically, the current trend envisions universities as 
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As a general matter, I agree with Richard Florida’s argument that an inordinate 
focus on innovation “misses the larger economic picture.”
Universities have been naively viewed as “engines” of innovation 
that pump out new ideas that can be translated into commercial 
innovations and regional growth.  This has led to overly 
mechanistic national and regional policies that seek to 
commercialize those ideas and transfer them to the private sector.  
Although there is nothing wrong with policies that encourage joint 
research, this view misses the larger economic picture:  
Universities are far more important as the nation’s primary source 
of knowledge creation and talent.  Smart people are the most 
critical resource to any economy, and especially to the rapidly 
growing knowledge-based economy on which the U.S. future 
rests.61
IV. STRATEGIES FOR UNIVERSITIES
Some seem to believe that university commercialization is simply 
inevitable.  In Capitalizing Knowledge, for example, Henry Etzkowitz claims that 
the “function of the university” has “irrevocably changed,” that ”[t]here is likely 
no return to an earlier era,” and that “the university is changing its organization 
and ideology to accommodate its new role in economic development.”  Not only 
do I disagree, but I find such assertions somewhat hyperbolic and misleading.62
active participants in the post-patent commercialization process, and critically, in the part of the 
process that bridges the gap between invention and innovation.  Bridging this gap is critical to the 
commercialization process and, as Auerswald and Branscomb have argued, a bridge may be 
collectively built by university researchers, entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, and other interested 
parties in a sort of collective entrepreneurship.  See Philip E. Auerswald & Lewis M. Branscomb, 
Start-ups and Spin-offs:  Collective Entrepreneurship Between Invention and Innovation, in THE 
EMERGENCE OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP POLICY 61, 79-80 (Ed., David M. Hart 2003).  Of course, 
building bridges consumes resources.  Perhaps universities would better serve innovation policy 
by focusing further upstream on the wide variety of inputs necessary for innovation, including 
both intellectual and human capital.  
61
 Richard Florida, The Role of the University:  Leveraging Talent, Not Technology, Science and 
Technology Online (Summer 1999), at http://www.isues.org/issues/15.4/florida.htm.
62
 Similarly, in Entrepreneurial Science:  The Second Academic Revolution, Henry Etzkowitz and 
Andrew Webster claim that “universities are undergoing a ‘second revolution.’” Henry Etzkowitz 
& Andrew Webster, Entrepreneurial Science:  The Second Academic Revolution, in CAPITALIZING 
KNOWLEDGE:  NEW INTERSECTIONS OF INDUSTRY AND ACADEMIA (Etzkowitz et al 1998).  I 
suppose I might be willing to agree if I also were willing to conclude that the broader 
commercialization, privatization and deregulation movement were part of an inevitable revolution 
as well.  But I do not.  Universities (and society more generally) should seriously evaluate such 
developments (and attendant claims of inevitable revolution) and not succumb to the dominant 
economic mindset without question.  See Jennifer Croissant & Sal Restivo, DEGREES OF 
COMPROMISE:  INDUSTRIAL INTEREST AND ACADEMIC VALUES xi-xii (2001) (“From the early 
1980s through the present, commercialization of research has been a consensus policy:  Not a 
natural “evolution” of research and development practices, but a conscious reprioritization by a 
broad coalition of actors.”).
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Universities, like any other organization, must adapt and evolve with changing 
economic and social conditions, but each university must determine its own 
“ideology” and mission and decide on the extent to which it should participate in 
commercialization, entrepreneurship and economic development.  
As noted earlier, the U.S. government has made an explicit policy decision 
to allow funded entities to obtain patents and thereby has encouraged participation 
in the commercialization of federally funded research.  Nonetheless, universities 
still must decide on the extent to which they wish to participate in the 
commercialization process.  As a general matter, universities are not required by 
law to create technology transfer offices, delay or withhold publication of 
research results, patent research results, issue exclusive licenses, or be 
entrepreneurs.  The Bayh-Dole Act enables universities to participate in the 
commercialization process, but it does not obligate or constrain them to pursue 
any particular strategy with respect to federally funded research.  Universities 
remain in the driver’s seat and may decide which road to take and at what speed.
There is no uniform answer for universities to the commercialization 
question.  The extent to which universities should actively participate in patenting 
and commercializing research and to which a university research system should 
be directed toward patentable research outputs will vary considerably across 
universities.  Some universities may have sufficient resources to resist pressure to 
optimize the university science and technology research system for commercial 
outputs; other universities may not.  Some universities may in fact prefer to 
optimize, perhaps because of a particular university mission, a vision of the 
university role in the modern economy, or strategic reasons related to faculty 
recruitment, student recruitment, prestige, or public image.  In the end, with 
respect to patent policy, technology transfer, commercialization, and 
entrepreneurship, universities have choices and face competing incentives.  How 
to proceed depends upon the particular university’s objectives for its science and 
technology research system.
Perhaps idealistically (or even ideologically), I envision robust 
competition among universities operating on different models and pursuing 
different strategies, missions, and ideologies.  Some universities may actively 
engage in the commercialization process without affecting their science and 
technology research systems.  Other universities may need to choose whether to 
optimize their science and technology research systems for commercial research 
outputs or to sustain a mixed system.  In the various markets that universities 
compete (for faculty, students, government funds, etc.), different strategies may 
be successful.  That is, it may be the case that faculty, students, or funding 
agencies may look (dis)favorably on optimization.  I cannot offer broad 
prescriptions for universities regarding what strategy to pursue, but I believe it is 
critical that each university carefully evaluate its strategy in light of the demand-
side considerations I have noted in this essay. 
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Those universities that wish to preserve the integrity of their research 
systems and resist the pressure to optimize need to affirmatively take steps to 
manage conflicts of interests, to insulate from the demands of the marketplace 
upstream decisions regarding infrastructural capital allocation (i.e., decisions that 
impact the allocation of the five types of aggregated capital resources to particular 
types of productive activities), and ultimately to minimize (or eliminate) 
dependence upon commercial revenues for sustaining the research system.63
Those universities that wish to optimize their research systems for commercial 
outputs should do so explicitly with a full awareness of the risks and rewards.  
V. Conclusion
The issues surrounding commercialization of university research systems 
are quite similar to those surrounding the commercialization of mixed 
infrastructure, such as the Internet.  These resources are similar in terms of the 
manner in which they generate social value and in terms of the significant 
pressures they face to evolve to serve commercial ends.  In some cases, such as 
the Internet, technological design creates a buffer that resists optimization and 
protects the generic nature of the infrastructure.  In other cases, the law may 
create a similar buffer.64  In the case of university research systems, traditional 
buffers between universities and the market seem to be eroding.  In this essay, I 
have argued that this ought to be of significant concern to universities and society 
more generally because it may lead to a creeping systemic optimization of 
university research systems for commercializable outputs—a slow and subtle shift 
in the allocation of infrastructure resources, priorities, relationships, norms, and so 
on—dictated by the demands of downstream commercial markets.  I have not 
argued that commercialization of research results is inherently bad or undesirable.  
To the contrary, such commercialization ought to be pursued when possible.  It is 
the commercialization of university science and technology research systems with
which I am concerned.  Nor have I argued that universities should not participate 
in commercialization.  To the contrary, I suggest some should. 
Universities face difficult questions about the degree to which and manner 
in which they participate in patenting and more generally in the 
commercialization process.  As I noted in the beginning, to grapple with these 
questions, universities must step back from their immediate context, compare 
their situation with that of other industrial and social contexts, reflect on their role 
in society, and proceed carefully.
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 As Kathy Strandburg notes, many of the concerns in this context stem from scarce public 
funding.  See Strandburg, Curiosity Driven Research, supra note 26.
64
 For an argument that the Sony rule, which precludes secondary liability in situations where a 
technology is “capable of substantial noninfringing uses,” properly limits the scope of copyrights 
and acts as a legal buffer against commercialization, see Brett M. Frischmann, Peer-to-Peer 
Technology as Infrastructure: An Economic Argument For Retaining Sony's Safe Harbor For 
Technologies Capable of Substantial Noninfringing Uses, 52 J. COPYRIGHT SOCIETY 329 (2005).
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This essay has introduced the concept of “patent pull” to capture the 
demand manifesting quality of patents. Patents “pull” (private and public)
investment to productive activities that would be less attractive in the absence of 
patents. Exploring the role of patents from the demand side reveals that beyond 
affecting traditional capital investment decisions, patents can have more subtle 
and perhaps pervasive impacts on organizations and institutions, including but not 
limited to universities.  This essay has focused on university research systems; 
further research into the role of patents in other systems where government and 
other non-market processes fare well in manifesting and processing societal 
demand is needed.  That patents are introduced into the “normal” market setting 
to create distortions is well understood, but the impacts of such distortions upon 
priorities and the allocation of infrastructural capital within organizations and 
institutions requires further study.
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Production 
Processes
Outputs
FIGURE ONE:
SIMPLE VIEW OF UNIVERSITY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY RESEARCH SYSTEM 
AND ITS OUTPUTS
Production processes
• Research Processes
• Educational Processes
• Training processes
• Socialization processes
Human capital:  People
• Skilled labor
• Research community members
Intellectual capital:  Research results
• Basic  applied 
• Commercial  noncommercial
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FIGURE TWO:
SIMPLE VIEW OF UNIVERSITY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY RESEARCH SYSTEM, 
ITS OUTPUTS, AND THE DOWNSTREAM MARKETS FOR OUTPUTS
University S&T Research System:  
Infrastructural capital inputs
Production processes
Research, education, training, socialization
Outputs:
Human capital and intellectual capital
External Output Markets:
Industry:  Continued research, 
development and commercialization
Government, non-profit, universities, etc.: 
continued research; other noncommercial 
paths?
Also, need to add feedback loops 
to top box.  Rather than feeding 
the outputs back into the system 
as inputs, other inputs are fed 
back, such as financial capital
Internal Output Markets:
University S&T research system:  
continued research and development
Need to add feedback loop to top 
box.   Basically, the outputs are 
fed back into the system as inputs 
into further production
Spin-off companies:  Commercialization 
